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This article reviews Professor Dani Rodrik’s work on growth and development. The review 
first provides an outline of Rodrik’s critique of the Washington Consensus and his 
alternative ‘post-Washington’ paradigm for formulating and implementing growth strategies. 
The remainder of the paper then critically assesses some key elements of this alternative 
vision for development. In particular, the critical analysis focuses on Rodrik’s institutionalist 
revision of the existing growth evidence, his proposed changes to the way in which 
economists formulate policies in a post-Washington era, and his call for greater 
democratization as a universal institutional reform. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1990, John Williamson attempted to identify What Washington Means by Policy Reform. 
This consisted of a ten-point liberalizing reform agenda which, at that time, policymakers in 
the US government, the IMF and The World Bank all agreed upon.
1 But whilst this 
‘Washington Consensus’ arguably was the most influential development paradigm of the 
1980s and most of the 1990s, it is a reform agenda which has increasingly come under attack 
from a broad spectrum of eminent development economists whose interpretation of 
development theory and experience differs significantly to Washington’s policymakers.
2 
Arguably at the forefront of post-Washington proponents is Professor Dani Rodrik of 
Harvard University. Professor Rodrik has published a large body of work for two decades 
now which directly and indirectly criticizes the development strategy of the Washington 
institutions. He is also a widely demanded public speaker on this topic,
3 and his good name 
is liberally bandied about wherever development economists choose to gather in large 
numbers. But the surest sign that his efforts to significantly alter Washington’s approach to 
reform have finally met with some success is the publication of a recent World Bank report 
(The-World-Bank, 2005) - Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform - 
which provides a fresh and surprisingly critical appraisal of the so called Washington 
Consensus. Indeed, Rodrik has recently provided a very favorable review of this report 
(Rodrik, 2006), and the report itself has a bibliography which includes no less than twenty of 
Professor Rodrik’s works, far more than any other author referenced therein.  
And yet, despite the increasing notoriety of the work of Rodrik and his collaborators – 
including the various authors of Learning from a Decade of Reform - and some clear enunciation 
of precisely what it is this emerging school of thought rejects, it seems rather more difficult 
for the occasional reader to definitively say what it is that Professor Rodrik and his 
collaborators definitively embrace. Is Rodrik a free or strategic trader? Is he a supporter of 
government-led industrialization? Is he a shock therapist or a gradualist? Is he an 
                                                 
1 The specific ten points of the Washington Consensus are discussed in more detail in Section III (see Table 1). 
2 In September 2004, 16 well-known economists - Olivier Blanchard, Guillermo Calvo, Daniel Cohen, Stanley 
Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Jordi Galí, Ricardo Hausmann, Paul Krugman, Deepak Nayyar, José-Antonio 
Ocampo, Dani Rodrik, Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, Andrés Velasco, Jaime Ventura, and John Williamson - 
gathered in Barcelona, Spain, and, as a result of their meetings and deliberations, issued a document containing 
a new post-Washington consensus on growth and development, termed the Barcelona Consensus. 
3 Professor Rodrik has been an invited speaker at a range of prestigious events, including the WIDER Annual 
Lecture (November 2004), the Alfred Marshall Lecture of the European Economic Association (August 1996), 
and the Raul Prebisch Lecture of UNCTAD (October 1997).   3
institutionalist, and if he is, what kind of institutionalist? Considering how widely cited 
Professor Rodrik and his colleagues are, it is unusually difficult to associate his work with 
clear-cut answers to these questions. 
Thus the first objective of this review is to provide an overview of Rodrik’s criticisms of 
the Washington Consensus, and a synthesized outline of his alternative ‘post-Washington’ 
development paradigm. Section II begins by reviewing the background to Rodrik’s work, 
namely the rise of the Washington Consensus and its key policy elements, as synthesized by 
Williamson (1990). However, Section II also contrasts Williamson’s What Washington Means 
by Policy Reform with the very different set of prescriptions proposed by Robert Wade (1990) 
in Governing the Market. I will argue that these two references are invaluable for understanding 
Professor’s Rodrik’s more recent works, the key arguments of which are outlined in Section 
III. That outline also shows that Professor Rodrik does indeed address the types of 
questions raised in the preceding paragraph, although his answers are rarely of the definitive 
‘yes or no’ variety. Instead, like many post-Washington development economists, Rodrik 
seems to suggest that an unbiased reading of development experience to date elicits an 
interpretation that is far more nuanced than paradigms based on any one ‘big idea’ (Lindauer 
& Pritchett, 2002) or development ‘panacea’ (Easterly, 2002). Indeed, Professor Rodrik’s 
greatest contribution to date is not one grand theory of why countries develop. It is instead a 
revision to the way in which economists and policymakers might interpret the development 
experiences of the recent past, as well as a series of proposals for such experts might better 
formulate development strategies in a ‘post-Washington’ world. 
The second objective of this paper is to critically assess Professor Rodrik’s ‘revisionism’. 
Section IV addresses this objective by primarily focusing on those elements of his vision 
which I see as the most contentious. For example, Section IV will mostly overlook the issues 
of whether the Washington Consensus has really failed, and focus instead on Rodrik’s 
institutionalist interpretation of development history, his binding constraints growth 
diagnostic approach to growth strategizing, and his advocacy of democracy as a growth-
enhancing ‘meta-institution’. Along the way I will also contrast Rodrik’s revisionism with 
other heterodox economists, especially the aforementioned Robert Wade, as well as earlier 
institutionalists such as Irma Adelman and Gunnar Myrdal. Finally, Section V will provide a 
few concluding remarks as well as some overall assessment of Professor Rodrik’s 
contribution to development economics in a post-Washington era.   4
 
II. Background: What Washington Meant by Policy Reform. 
Since of much of Rodrik’s work on development strategies is based on a critique of the 
Washington Consensus, it is important to reiterate as precisely as possible what that 
Consensus entailed. Williamson’s (1990) original use of the term attempted to outline a 10-
point reform agenda upon which key US government and Bretton Woods policymakers 
broadly agreed. These ten policy instruments are listed in column 2 of Table 1, but they 
essentially comprise an across-the-board liberalization objective. Additional characteristics of 
Washington’s reform agenda, which more directly relate to governance issues, are listed in 
Table 2. A salient point of the Washington reform agenda described in both Tables 1 and 2 
is that this reform strategy was advocated for a large number of countries, first in Latin 
America in the 1980s, but then increasingly in Africa and Asia. And thanks to the technical 
assistance programs and the conditionalities embodied in their structural adjustment 
packages of the IMF and The World Bank, many developing countries closely followed these 
prescriptions. So the widespread adoption of these reforms implies that the Washington 
‘experiment’ was not short of subjects.
4  
By a happy coincidence, in the same year that Williamson outlined Washington 
Consensus, Professor Robert Wade – now of the London School of Economics but 
previously with The World Bank - published his widely read Governing the Market, a heterodox 
revision of the contribution of East Asian governments to the remarkable economic success 
of that region (especially Taiwan, China). In Chapter 12 of that text Wade outlines his own 
10-point reform agenda based on his revision of the East Asian evidence. This agenda is 
relevant to the present discussion for two reasons. 
First, Wade’s revionist agenda provides a strong contrast to the Washington agenda. A 
perusal of the final columns of Tables 1 and 2 below indicates that Wade’s analysis of East 
Asia’s success led him to propose a growth strategy which includes significant government 
leadership in guiding the economy through the complex process of structural 
transformation. Hence he proposes strategic trade and investment policies to shift 
production into sectors of future importance for the national economy. A second and 
somewhat overlooked feature of Wade’s prescriptions relate to political economy and 
                                                 
4 One caveat here, discussed further below, is that many developing countries at least partially resisted 
some of the Washington Consensus reform efforts (especially in Africa).   5
governance (Table 2). Wade heavily stressed the conditions under which bureaucratic and 
political decision-making could be improved. In particular, Wade warned of the dangers of 
‘shock therapy’ and across-the-board reforms (just prior to their disastrous use in Eastern 
Europe), as well as the risks associated with premature democratization. Wade is also 
skeptical that there is any good evidence that provides general support for decentralization.
5 
He instead emphasized the importance of growth coalitions between government elites and 
industrial groups, and the need to create an elite bureaucratic cadre for the purpose of 
fostering industrial transformation. The existence of a ‘growth coalition’ and an elite 
bureaucracy would also justify less dependence on discretionary rules, which the Washington 
policymakers regularly favor for the presumed robustness to government corruption and 
incompetence.  
Wade’s heterodox vision is relevant for another reason, for it bears strong similarities to 
much of Rodrik’s work on the benefits of trade liberalization, the importance of strategic 
trade and industrialization policies, and the non-equivalency of neoclassical theory and 
practice, as I explore below. Rodrik, in fact, might also be classified as an East Asian 
revisionist (Rodrik, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996a, 1997a, 
1997b), although much of his recent work takes a more global perspective. So I will ask 
readers to bear Wade’s growth strategy in mind as explore the more nuanced approach 
which Professor Rodrik has proposed. 
                                                 
5 Professor Wade’s views on decentralization are not directly based on statements in Governing the Market, 
but are instead based on personal communications with the author.   6
Table 1. Contrasting two existing reform paradigms: Williamson’s (1990) Washington Consensus vs. Wade’s revisionist prescriptions. 
Policy domain  The Original Washington Consensusa  Wade’s (1990) Revisionist position 
Size of government 1.  Fiscal  discipline.  Cautious agreement.  
  2. Reorder public expenditure priorities (i.e. from 
production subsidies to social sectors & infrastructure).
Disagreement: At the margin sectoral expenditure on agriculture and industry, to 
change production structure, may be just as important as social expenditure.  
 3.  Privatization.  Disagreement: Public ownership in upstream industries may be sensible. 
  4. Tax reform (broaden base, moderate marginal tax 
rates). 
Partial agreement only: Tax base can include substantial customs revenue.  
Finance & Trade  5. Financial liberalization (formerly “liberalization of 
interest rates”). 
Disagreement: Governments should own some banks, provide selective credit 
for strategic industries, impose substantial capital account controls, and only 
liberalize financial sector late in reform process.  
  6. Competitive exchange rates.   Partial agreement only: There may be a case for an undervalued exchange rate as 
a spur to industrialization (see above and below).b 
  7. Trade liberalization.  Disagreement: Liberalize strategically, use protection to support infant industry 
(but withdraw from non-infants and perpetual infants), liberalize imports for 
exporters, quantitative restrictions can be useful. 
  8. FDI liberalization.  Disagreement: In the general case FDI flows should be conditional upon 
domestic content requirements, export requirements, foreign exchange 
restrictions. 
Competition  9. Deregulation (entry and exit barriers).  Disagreement: Limit competition if there are economies of scale and 
coordination failures. 
Property rights  10. Grant private property rights when costs 
acceptable. 
Partial agreement. There can be functional alternatives to property rights and 
their enforcement as defined in the West.  
 
Notes: a. The ‘Original Washington Consensus’ refers to Williamson’s (1990) original ten-point agenda, not to the subsequent augmentation of this list which Rodrik’s 
has termed The Washington Consensus Mark II. b. Wade is also skeptical that it is feasible to define competitive exchange rates via theoretical means, and skeptical that 
free markets will achieve competitive rates.    7
Table 2. Other Washington Consensus reform strategies vs. Wade’s revisionist prescriptions. 
Policy domain  Other Washington reform strategies   Wade’s (1990) revisionist position 
Reform scope, speed.  Wide, quick.  Disagreement: Reforms should be sequential, gradual, and targeted at real 
constraints in a given time period, in line with limited public implementation 
capacity.  
Political structure Democratization.a  Disagreement: There is no good evidence in support of a general presumption in 
favor of democratization.  But irrespective of the political system in place, 
policymakers should develop corporatist ‘growth coalitions’ between 
government elites and industrialists. 
  Decentralization.  Disagreement: There is no good evidence in support of a general presumption in 
favor of decentralization. More emphasis should be placed on creating an elite 
bureaucratic cadre capable for the purpose of guiding industrial transformation. 
Scope for policy 
discretion b 
Limited: rules are favored over discretion (e.g. fiscal 
discipline, monetary policy, tariff policies). 
Disagreement: There is no general principle or evidence favoring the limitation 
of discretion for policymakers in developing countries. 
 
Notes: a. The World Bank and IMF do not have mandates to intervene in the political processes of their client countries, so this criterion only relates to US 
government institutions. b. Examples of Washington policymakers favoring discretion which are listed in Williamson (1990) include: fiscal deficits constrained by debt 
to GDP ratios, the removal of import licenses and highly differential tariff structures, a preference for floating exchange rates over discretionary systems, preferences 
for privatization over public management, and concerns that government regulation breeds corruption. 
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III. The Rodrik Critique. 
What, then, is Rodrik’s own reading of development experience to date, and what are the 
practical conclusions to be drawn from this interpretation? 
III.1 The practical problem: the failure of the Washington Consensus. 
The relatively uncontroversial part of the critique made by Rodrik and the Barcelona 
Consensus is that the Washington Consensus reforms have produced disappointing results 
on average. The apparent failure of state-centric approaches to development in the 1970s 
seemed to warrant enthusiasm for a much more liberal policymaking paradigm in the early 
1980s. Thus The World Bank and the IMF began to make their concessional loans 
conditional upon the recipient government’s enacting a wide range of liberalizing reforms in 
trade, government finances, monetary policy and interest rates, state owned enterprises, 
foreign investment, and regulatory policy. However, Rodrik sees this paradigm as having 
failed in two dimensions. First, when liberalization has been carried out more or less 
wholesale – as in Latin America – the results have been disappointing (Rodrik, 2001, 2005a). 
Growth has often accelerated very little or not at all, and the impact on the poor has been 
unfavorable or negligible. Second, liberalization reforms have often been rejected or heavily 
watered down in much of Africa and parts of Asia because the liberalization blueprint has 
proved to be unpopular with policymakers and/or voters (Rodrik, 1996b). 
III.2 The methodological problem. 
The failure of the Washington Consensus appears to be paradoxical given the large body 
of empirical evidence demonstrating the importance ‘market friendly’ policies. Surely 
countries pursuing inward-oriented import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies have 
grown more slowly relative to the outward-oriented export-promoting East Asian miracles 
(Balassa, 1971; Krueger, 1978, 1983; Krueger, Schiff, & Valdes, 1991; Little, Scitovsky, & 
Scott, 1970)? Surely LDCs have often engaged in bloated government expenditure practices 
which encouraged corruption, cronyism and inefficiency (Ades & di Tella, 1997; Krueger, 
1974)? Surely the empirical macroeconomic literature – i.e. growth regressions - has amply 
demonstrated the superior performance of more liberally oriented economies (Burnside & 
Dollar, 2000; Dollar, 1992; Sachs & Warner, 1995)?  
By and large Rodrik rejects these empirical conclusions. For example, whilst it is true that 
developing countries pursued ISI in the 1960s and experienced slower growth thereafter, the 
slowdown was in fact chiefly triggered by external shocks which had little to do with trade   9
and industrialization policies (Rodrik, 2000a). The failure of these economies to buffer such 
shocks was more likely due to poor institutions, especially macroeconomic institutions, but 
also institutions related to conflict management. And whilst big governments have often 
failed to ignite growth, many large governments – often with strategic trade and 
industrialization policies - have also succeeded (China, Botswana, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Vietnam). And finally, the macroeconomic ‘growth regressions’ literature is inherently 
constrained in both its ability to measure policies and institutions in detail, and in its ability 
to deal with some fundamental endogeneity problems (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001; Rodrik, 
2005b). 
III.3 Explaining the failure of the neoclassical reform. 
Whilst methodological problems explain part of the apparent paradox between the 
empirical support of the neoclassical paradigm in the academic literature and the observed 
failure of the Washington Consensus in the real world, this explanation would be incomplete 
without an alternative theoretical explanation for the disappointing performance of 
liberalization efforts in the last twenty years. Rodrik proposes three such hypotheses. 
First, early Washington Consensus reform attempts were theoretically misguided in 
viewing bad policies as the root cause of failed development. In doing so they neglected the 
importance of reforming the institutions – key determinants of development in the long run 
- that both support and constrain the market. Rodrik also appears to agree with the widely 
held view that reform packages consistently failed to compensate the losers from reforms, 
and underemphasized the key role of financial regulation.  
Second, whilst ‘Second Generation’ Washington reformers did at least try to incorporate 
more emphasis on institutionalism and poverty reduction, they still attempted to export a 
common policy and institutional blueprint to a diverse set of developing countries. In 
Rodrik’s appraisal this failure to incorporate country-specific factors – geography, history, 
culture, and current policies and institutions – are likely to render the blueprint’s policy 
prescriptions ineffective, and potentially even regressive. So while Rodrik agrees that these 
first order goals are important, he suggests that there is no unique mapping from policy 
targets to policy instruments (Rodrik, 2005a).  
A third and final mistake of the second-generation Washington reformers, and reformers 
of other bents, is that they have become increasingly prone to over-ambition. The 
Washington Consensus Mark I may have had some omissions, but its reform agenda was   10
parsimonious relative to its Mark II descendent, which now includes a ‘laundry list’ of other 
reforms and a mandate to achieve a whole host of Millennium Development Goals. Whilst 
carrying out one reform but ignoring conditional reforms can be dangerous (as per the 
theory of Second Best), carrying out all reforms simultaneously is institutionally infeasible in 
underdeveloped countries.  
III.4 Towards a new development paradigm. 
If the Washington Consensus paradigm is flawed, what sort of paradigm should replace 
it? Rodrik’s revisionist paradigm relies on several core tenets about the workings of markets 
and governments, some of which apply generally to all economies, and some to developing 
countries in particular. 
III.4.1. The role of markets. 
Rodrik holds that agents are individually rational inasmuch as they respond to economic 
incentives, and that market-based economic systems can lead to sustained growth in the 
absence of significant market failures. However, in addition to the standard failings of 
markets (public goods, externalities, monopolies) market-based economies face other 
problems which are accentuated in developing countries. Like development pioneers such as 
Hirschman (1958) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Rodrik emphasizes coordination failures, 
economies of scale and various spillover effects (Rodrik, 2005a), as well as imperfect 
knowledge of what it is a country is good at producing (Hausman & Rodrik, 2003). Markets 
can also generate highly unequal outcomes, thereby promoting conflict which the market 
cannot automatically correct (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Rodrik, 2005a). And markets are 
subjected to severe exogenous shocks which can significantly impede longer run 
development unless their influence is appropriately checked by good institutions (Rodrik, 
1999). So although markets are potentially a fecund source of growth and development, 
“markets need not be self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, and self-legitimizing” 
(Rodrik, 2005a). 
III.4.2. The role of governments. 
These market failures nominally justify a role for governments in creating policies and 
institutions that support, restrain, and in some cases replace, private markets. So in the long 
run governments ultimately need to provide institutions that achieve the following 
intermediate policy targets (Rodrik, 2005a): 
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•  A rule of law which grants adequate and secure control of property; 
•  Appropriate restraint of market excesses (pollution, monopoly power, financial 
imprudence, inequality); 
•  Sound macroeconomic management (e.g. stable prices, adequate access to credit, 
opportunities for trade, business cycle smoothing); 
•  Social insurance (e.g. poverty alleviation); and  
•  Management of conflict (e.g. appropriate distributional policies, adequate justice system). 
 
However, such a list of intermediate targets cannot simply be pegged on to the already 
extensive list of Washington Consensus policy instruments outlined by Williamson (1990). 
For one thing, the policies and institutions which can achieve these outcomes are 
environment-specific, so the effective adaptation of existing institutional paradigms requires 
country-specific knowledge and a flexible and open-minded consideration of the types of 
public policies which might achieve these institutional outcomes. There are two important 
implications of this point. First, most of these ‘new’ policy and institutional arrangements 
will not be found in economics textbooks; rather they are pragmatic ‘on the ground’, ‘home-
grown’ solutions to idiosyncratic problems (Rodrik, 2005a, 2006). Second, the political 
structures that are typically best suited to imbuing policy design with the necessary degree of 
country-specific knowledge and political support are democratic and participatory (Rodrik, 
2000b). Democracy, in fact, might be thought of as a meta-institution which improves policy 
and institutional design in a number of different dimensions. 
III.V.3 Towards a new growth strategy. 
Governments need not only be more flexible, experimental and democratic, they must 
also be more parsimonious in their reform efforts. For whilst a broad array of institutional 
functions must be present if an economy is to achieve development in the long run, different 
functions are important at different stages in the growth process. For example, the 
institutions and policies that enable growth are not necessarily those that are important for 
sustaining growth (Rodrik, 2006). A consequence of this is that governments do not need to 
carry out a full ‘laundry list’ of reforms to initiate growth, or for that matter to sustain it. 
Because whilst a laundry list reform agenda might be optimal as per the Theory of Second 
Best – which states that the removal of any one distortion in the presence of other market or   12
government distortions is not an action guaranteed to improve welfare – that laundry list is 
both technically and politically infeasible in practice. Instead, policymakers would do well to 
identify the largest direct constraint to growth as the policy target of immediate interest, and 
concentrate public resources into removing that constraint before addressing all others 
(Hausman, Rodrik, & Velasco, 2006). I hereafter term this approach the ‘binding constraints 
growth diagnostic’.
6  
And finally, one last point of note should be mentioned. Whilst Rodrik supports 
parsimony and flexibility, he does necessarily vindicate gradualism, at least in the sense that 
any given distortion should only be removed slowly. His primary concern over that sort of 
gradualism is that it sends uncertain signals to private investors, and may therefore 
undermine government credibility and inhibit responses from the private sector. Thus, if 
anything, Rodrik favors ‘radical reform in a narrow range of policies’ (Rodrik, 1990). 
 
IV. Discussion 
Hopefully the above synthesis of Rodrik’s writings has done appropriate justice to the 
intended meaning of the cited works. Let us now proceed to critically consider some of the 
key elements of Rodrik’s post-Washington paradigm.  
IV.1 The failures of the Washington Consensus. 
If one were to begin at the beginning, the first aspect of Rodrik’s critique that should be 
considered is to what degree the Washington Consensus has really failed as an operational 
growth strategy. Were one to play the devil’s advocate, so to speak, it would be important to 
point out the following: 
 
a. Many alleged proponents of the Washington Consensus have argued that there is not one 
strict Washington ‘growth blueprint’ and that in practice the Washington institutions have 
engaged in sufficiently flexible policymaking, constrained as they are by the need for a 
certain degree of internal policy coherence. Nevertheless, most independent observers feel 
                                                 
6 By ‘direct’ obstacle, Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco (2006) refer to distortions that have the largest direct 
effects on growth, where indirect effects refer to the effects hat removing this distortion will have on other 
distortions in the economy, which may be positive or negative. Thus there is no guarantee that their strategy 
will be welfare improving, but removing large direct distortions seems the safest way to proceed in the absence 
of perfect knowledge the strength and direction of indirect effects, and in the presence of limited technical and 
political capability to address all constraints simultaneously.    13
that these institutions have only displayed flexibility at the margin.
7 For example, the 
conditions attached to structural adjustment loans (SALs) are fairly explicit and show 
substantial similarities across countries in terms of their basic elements. 
b. The task the Washington institutions set themselves – that of reforming policies in 
countries with long histories of poor policies, weak institutions and considerable political 
instability – was not an easy one, and universally successful reform outcomes were (and still 
are) an unrealistic aspiration. 
c. Not all domestic political opposition to Washington-based reforms has been legitimate 
(i.e. based on valid economic or social concerns). 
d. Some of Washington’s “students” have performed quite well, especially in recent years 
(Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania). 
e. Following from d., it is important to remember that the returns to economic reforms are 
sometimes difficult to measure, since reform outcomes are affected by exogenous events 
(e.g. terms of trade movements, political changes) and may only be positive in the longer 
term.  
f. While the Washington Consensus as a whole might have failed, this does not mean that 
there is not widespread agreement on the importance of many of the elements of 
Williamson’s 10-point reform agenda (especially avoiding significant macroeconomic 
distortions). 
 
Though it is important to bear these kinds of arguments in mind, it is well beyond the 
scope of this review to fully appraise to what extent the Washington Consensus has failed; 
that primarily empirical task has been carried out elsewhere (Easterly, 2005; The-World-
Bank, 2005), although there are still significant methodological challenges involved, as 
Rodrik  himself would have to admit (Rodrik, 2005b). At any rate even a fairly conservative 
assessment would necessarily conclude that the Washington Consensus has failed to live up 
to its own expectations, even if there is some doubt as to the degree of failure, and what 
                                                 
7 For example, one World Bank economist objected to the notion that The World Bank always calls reduces 
government expenditure, citing instances where they have called for greater tax revenue to achieve reductions 
in the fiscal deficit. Of course, the objective of achieving reductions in the fiscal deficit is still the same, and 
there is considerable evidence that important government expenditures have decreased under Washington 
conditionalities (Fan & Rao, 2004; Lipton & Ahmed, 1997).   14
might have happened had other strategies been pursued. So for the remainder of this 
discussion I will take this alleged failure for granted. 
IV.2 Rodrik’s revisionism. 
Let us therefore turn our attention to Rodrik’s revision of growth experience in general, 
including East Asian experience. ‘Revisionism’ aptly refers to the act of demonstrating that 
existing research has misinterpreted or ignored importance evidence. Thus earlier East Asian 
Revisionists, such as Wade (1990) and Amsden (1989), went to great lengths to show that 
the neoclassical interpretation of the source of East Asia’s growth success – in a word, the 
market – was erroneous. In fact, say these Revisionists, most relevant East Asian economies 
had high degrees of government intervention, including (but not limited to) a significant 
number of state owned enterprises in key sectors, surprisingly large but also quite strategic 
trade barriers, and highly regulated and often publicly owned financial sectors. Rodrik also 
emphasizes these kinds of diverse government interventions, and so he very much follows in 
the footsteps of Amsden and Wade in this regard.
8  
Methodological critiques are also a common component of revisionism. However, one 
partial difference between Rodrik and the East Asian revisionism of the late 1980s is that 
much of the subsequent literature in the 1990s has moved away from East Asian analysis per 
se to a greater use of cross-country comparisons, often via the near-ubiquitous growth 
regression. So Rodrik’s critique of cross-country econometric analysis is arguably a very 
important component of his revisionism (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001), even though it is, in 
part, an extension of Wade’s own critique of the cross-country evidence a decade earlier (see 
Chapter 1 of Wade (1990), pages 15-22). These kinds of criticisms of the cross-country 
evidence also appear to have gained in influence. A recent 29-person panel of experts 
reviewing World Bank research from 1998 to 2005, for example, came down heavily indeed 
upon the Bank’s over-use of cross-country econometrics (Banerjee, Deaton, Lustig, Rogoff, 
& Hsu, 2006). Perhaps the implication of these methodological critiques is that the 
development profession as a whole is now much more skeptical of the international 
‘evidence’ on the virtues of neoliberal policies.
9 
                                                 
8 Although several of Rodrik’s earliest works already dealt with precisely these issues at around the same time as 
Amsden and Wade were writing (Rodrik, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1994). 
9 Of course, the term “as a whole” is important here: perceptions in The World Bank could be quite 
different to impressions in independent academia.   15
But on the other hand, what are the alternatives to cross-country growth regressions? 
Rodrik has pursed several alternative approaches. First, he has used cross-country 
regressions, but examined the data in different ways, focusing on event analysis such as oil 
shocks (Rodrik, 1999) and growth accelerations (Hausman, Pritchett, & Rodrik, 2005). These 
studies are new and insightful ways at re-examining cross-country growth patterns, but I 
must admit to being skeptical as to whether they provide any fundamental advantages 
relative to conventional growth regressions. Cross-country event analysis still tends to rely 
on highly aggregated measurement units and restrictive parameter homogeneity assumptions, 
and event analysis is unlikely to overcomes basic endogeneity challenges of the kind 
identified by Rodrik himself (Rodrik, 2005b).
10 
A second approach which Rodrik adopts is the more informal analysis of stylized facts, a 
type of analysis best embodied in Growth Strategies (Rodrik, 2005a). That particular essay is a 
remarkably good non-econometric analysis of growth history, and a real ‘must-read’ for any 
student of development. The uniqueness of Rodrik’s analysis in Growth Strategies is that 
instead of looking for common ‘best practice’ policies across countries – as one would 
implicitly do in any linear growth regression, as well in case studies of East Asian ‘miracles’ – 
Rodrik emphasizes the different policies which fast growing countries have pursued. From 
these differences and, more specifically, these departures from the Washington Consensus 
strategy, Rodrik concludes that the most important stylized facts of development experience 
to date are that one size most certainly does not fit all, that development is largely a 
homegrown affair, and that neoclassical theory is consistent with a diverse range of 
government interventions. Of course, these conclusions are not entirely unique to Rodrik. 
Adelman and Morris (Adelman & Morris, 1967, 1988; 1997) heavily emphasized ‘alternative 
development paths’ from the 1960s onward, albeit based on cross-country econometric   
techniques. Robert Wade makes some very similar conclusions on the non-equivalency of 
neoclassical theory and neoclassical policies in Governing the Market, as does Stiglitz (1994) in 
                                                 
10 With regard to endogeneity issues, the factors that statistically explain a growth acceleration are just as likely to 
be endogenous as those used to statistically account for average growth rates. In the case of policy responses to 
common shocks – such as oil shocks (Rodrik, 1999) – the problem may be less severe in that one can ideally 
gauge diverse policy responses to a common event. However: one would still need to control for an array of 
factors in order to estimate the true effect of any individual factor; common shocks are few and far between, so 
event analysis provides limited opportunities for empirical analysis; what are presumed to be common shocks 
are unlikely to really be common (e.g. oil shocks vary according to dependence on oil).    16
Whither Socialism.
11 And the profession as a whole has increasingly gravitated towards ‘helping 
developing countries help themselves’ and greater ‘ownership’ of reform strategies. But 
nevertheless, Rodrik’s inductive analysis in Growth Strategies is exceptional insofar as it unifies 
all these arguments into a clear and coherent revision of recent development experience. 
Yet the inductive approach used in Growth Strategies i s  n o t  a n  a n a l y s i s  f r e e  o f  
methodological pitfalls. Consider, for example, the following extract from that paper: 
Function does not map uniquely into form. It would be hard to explain otherwise how 
social systems that are so different in their institutional details as those of the United 
States, Japan, and Europe have managed to generate roughly similar levels of wealth 
for their citizens. All these societies protect property rights, regulate product, labor, 
and financial markets, have sound money, and provide for social insurance. But the 
rules of the game that prevail in the American style of capitalism are very different 
from those in the Japanese style of capitalism. Both differ from the European style. 
 
But from this can we emphatically conclude that these specific institutional forms were really 
important for growth?  If X different countries achieved the same institutional outcomes 
with X different types of specific institutional forms, then might we not also conclude that 
the specific institutional forms which these countries adopted were irrelevant?  Is it possible 
that Japan would have grown just as quickly with an American-style labor market?  The 
answer to all these questions is “Yes”, for it is at least possible that the specific institutional 
forms adopted by different successful countries were largely irrelevant.
12 Perhaps it is not 
diverse institutions that matter but other common factors – geography, hard work, luck. Or 
                                                 
11 Consider, for example, the following quote from Wade (1990, p. 349): 
‘A distinction has to be made between what is consistent with neoclassical theory and what is consistent 
with neoclassical prescription. There is room within the confines of neoclassical theory for practically any 
mix of markets and interventions.’ 
Rodrik has emphasized the same conclusion is many different papers and presentations: 
‘There is no unique mapping between these objectives and specific policy proposals, which is the next 
point on which there is by now a fair amount of consensus. . . General principles of good economic policy 
do not map directly and uniquely into specific policy agendas.’  Rethinking Growth Policies (Rodrik, 2004) 
or: 
‘All of the above institutional anomalies are compatible with, and can be understood in terms of, 
neoclassical economic reasoning (“good economics”). Neoclassical economic analysis does not determine 
the form that institutional arrangements should or do take.’ Growth Strategies (Rodrik, 2005a). 
12 The same type of critique could be applied to many other inductively derived conclusions in this literature. 
Countries engaged in diverse industrial policies, some being associated with industrial success (East Asia) and 
others with industrial failure (e.g. Latin America). The literature has looked for differences in the industrial 
strategies of these countries – such as discretion- versus rules-based regimes, or whether the carrot was 
accompanied by the stick – but without much in the way of definitive conclusions. Compare Rodrik (Rodrik, 
1995b) to the World Bank (The-World-Bank, 1993) for example.   17
it may be that specific institutional forms must be diverse, but only in a systematic way, 
perhaps according to stages of development. Wade (1990), Adelman and Morris (1967), and 
Myrdal (1968), for example, all argue – with slight differences in terminology and other 
specifics – for ‘hard states’ at early stages of development (i.e. post-War Japan, South Korea 
or Taiwan) followed by more participatory regimes later on (the U.S., present day Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan). Indeed, the historical evidence for this evolution from hard states 
to participatory regimes is very strong. 
This is not to say that Rodrik’s inductive conclusions in Growth Strategies and other papers 
are wrong, merely that they are vulnerable to the functionalist fallacy that because countries 
adopt different institutional forms, these different forms necessarily serve important 
functions. This means that the evidence which Rodrik cites – especially on institutional 
diversity - is open to more interpretations than his alone. 
There are at least two other related problems in papers such as Growth Strategies. First, this 
kind of inductive institutionalism, though insightful, does not yield much in the way of 
testable hypotheses. For one thing, institutions are difficult to identify and measure (again, 
this is not to say that we should ignore them or not try to measure or identify them). But 
more importantly, it is a bold departure from conventional research to conclude that 
successful countries have so little in common with one another that researchers can draw no 
concrete generalizations as to what policies might promote faster and more pro-poor 
growth.
13 In contrast, earlier institutionalists – the Wades, Adelmans and Myrdals – argued 
that the optimality of such alternative development paths was relatively systematic, and 
therefore discernible in the international evidence (as with the above example of the 
evolution from hard states to more participatory regimes). Rodrik offers very little in the way 
of this kind of second-order generalization, which means that his conclusions lack testability, 
let alone the resonant directness of earlier theories of growth, including the Washington 
Consensus. For example, even though Rodrik supports the idea of bringing industrialization 
policies back to the policy table (Hausman & Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, forthcoming), he cannot 
                                                 
13 Certainly existing research on growth has highlighted a number of common determinants. Consider, for 
example, the broad number of common policy and non-policy determinants explaining East Asian growth 
(The-World-Bank, 1993). And while Rodrik may be rightly skeptical of large parts of the cross-country 
empirics literature, this literature has at least provided statistically powerful explanations of the variation in 
cross-country growth experiences (Temple, 1999).   18
unequivocally support industrial policies (as per Wade)
14 because the optimality of individual 
policies is context specific (Rodrik, 2005a).  
It should again be stressed that we need not necessarily conclude that Rodrik’s 
interpretation of institutional diversity is wrong, merely that there are other interpretations of 
the facts which he draws upon, and that his own interpretation is not easily amenable to 
standard empirical tests. No less importantly, the logical impossibility of simultaneously 
emphasizing institutional diversities and advocating concrete policy prescriptions forces 
Rodrik into making prescriptions that are highly general, extremely nuanced and rather 
guarded. This means that Rodrik’s message lacks the popular (populist?) appeal of the more 
concrete statements put forth by earlier institutionalists as well as Rodrik’s contemporaries 
(such as Jeffrey Sachs (2005a) or Nicholas Stern (2001)). 
IV.3 Binding constraints growth diagnostics. 
In the face of context-specific policy optimality, Rodrik and his coauthors (Birdsall, 
Rodrik, & Subramanian, 2005; Hausman et al., 2006) propose that economists and other 
technocrats should adopt a diagnostic approach to policymaking. As I noted in the previous 
section, the main novelty of their approach is that they favor the sequential identification and 
removal of the largest direct obstacles to growth, rather than hopelessly optimistic ‘laundry 
list’ reform agendas (e.g. Millennium Development Goals), Second Best ‘tailoring’, or the 
importation of ‘one size fits all’ blueprints and erroneous ‘best practices’ (e.g. Washington 
Consensus).  
There are two relevant issues concerning growth diagnostics. First, Rodrik and colleagues 
are certainly not alone in advocating a more humble, more pragmatic and less ambitious 
diagnostic approach to policymaking. Humility, pragmatism and interdisciplinary 
diagnostism are all features of growth strategies advocated by earlier institutionalists 
(Adelman & Morris, 1967; Myrdal, 1968),
15 and more recently by Professor Jeffrey Sachs 
(2005a). The bindings constraints diagnostic approach also shares some small affinity with 
the multiple gap class of models proposed by Chenery and Strout (1966). The principle is 
much the same, but what most economists have learned – or re-learned – since Chenery and 
                                                 
14 In the preface to a recent second edition of Governing the Market (Wade, 2004), Wade is arguably more 
cautious about feasibility of strategic trade and industrial policies in small countries with limited potential for 
government leadership and strong interlinkages between sectors in the domestic economy. But although this 
caveat qualifies his earlier proposals somewhat, it is a caveat which is still consistent with the idea that ‘good 
policies’ can be identified and prescribed in a relatively systematic fashion. 
15 In the case of Myrdal (1968), see Appendix II, much of which was authored by Paul Streeten.   19
Strout’s seminal work, is that the obstacles to growth are far more numerous and non-
economic in nature than just investment, foreign exchange gaps or fiscal gaps. So an integral 
feature of any diagnostic approach in the modern era must incorporate a fairly broad array of 
growth determinants, including informal institutions, which often seem to be consciously or 
unconsciously neglected in Rodrik’s work.
16  
In that vein the more relevant approach is the ‘growth diagnosticism’ of Professor Jeffrey 
Sachs. Indeed Sachs (2005a) arguably provides a more complete list of potential obstacles to 
growth than Rodrik and colleagues. The main point of difference, however, is the scope of 
reform. Sachs agrees with the humility that comes with an inductive interdisciplinary analysis 
of development problems (i.e. geography, disease burdens), but, by my reading at least, Sachs 
disagrees with the notion of a modest sequential reform strategy a la Rodrik.
17 Indeed, Sachs 
sees modest ‘piecemeal’ growth strategies as wasteful and unnecessary, and is the leading 
advocate of a ‘laundry list’ of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Who is right, Sachs 
or Rodrik?  
On the one hand there is probably agreement among many economists with Rodrik’s 
assessment of the failure of laundry list Washington Consensus programs in countries 
severely constrained by financial capital, technical capital and political capital. The literatures 
on the effectiveness of policy reform and foreign aid have made ample note of small returns 
to ‘big pushes’, and there is a widespread feeling in the profession that aid projects and 
technical assistance must be able to extract more bang for any given buck. But whilst laundry 
list reform strategies and large scale aid flows have often disappointed in the past, economic 
theory and development experience only provide limited support for Rodrik’s targeted 
reform strategy.  
In terms of economic theory, Rodrik and collaborators justify a binding constraints 
growth diagnostic with the rather loose idea that the direct benefits of removing a large 
                                                 
16 For example, in Growth Strategies Rodrik mentions informal institutions but then intentionally ignores them. I 
am not sure why. As Rodrik would doubtlessly acknowledge, informal institutions are extremely important in 
development – indeed, they are usually considered more important at earlier stages of development – and 
integral to the kinds of institutional principles, such as conflict management, that Rodrik identifies (see Section 
II). 
17 In a response to Easterly’s critique of the Millennium Development Goals, Sachs writes:  
Easterly's call to do things piecemeal is vacuous. Shall we do vaccinations this decade, AIDS control 
the next, malaria control in the 2020s, clean drinking water in the 2030s, and food production in the 
2040s? There is no reason why we can't help poor countries to invest in clinics, schools, roads and 
improved farms during the next 20 years.   - (Sachs, 2005b) 
         20
distortion are likely to outweigh any indirect ‘interaction’ effects between distortions (as per 
the Theory of Second Best). For this outcome to hold Rodrik et al. must assume: (a) that 
direct effects of removing a distortion are measurable and predictable; (b) that interaction 
effects between distortions are not measurable or predictable but are nevertheless small 
relative to the direct effects of removing distortions; and (c) that the size of any deleterious 
interaction effects between distortions are not positively correlated with the size of the direct 
effects of removing distortions (i.e. that if we remove the biggest direct distortions we will 
not be systematically increasing the size of any deleterious indirect effects between 
distortions). Perhaps we can accept these assumptions, but this is certainly a murky area in 
which formal theory offers very limited guidance.
18 
Moreover, historical evidence presents us with two stylized facts which seem inconsistent 
with Rodrik’s binding constraints diagnostic approach. First, the most successful developing 
countries – South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore – may have not have liberalized their 
economies all at once (a point made by Rodrik, Wade and others), but they did achieve a 
wide range of socio-economic outcomes in a fairly simultaneous fashion (Headey, 2006; 
The-World-Bank, 1993). In other words, it was as if they succeeded in achieving MDG-type 
targets. For these countries excelled not only in increasing incomes, but also in 
contemporaneously increasing education, health, and infrastructure, and in managing the 
macroeconomy. So one reasonable interpretation of their growth paths is that they represent 
big socioeconomic pushes, rather than more targeted pushes aimed at relieving the most 
binding constraints first.
 19 Of course, one can argue for different strokes for different folks – 
Africa today is not East Asia of yesteryear – but Rodrik and colleagues need to confront 
these kinds of stylized fact and not simply rest their arguments on a highly abstract 
theoretical model.  
A second empirical fact which their work does not confront is the more challenging 
African context. Rodrik et al.’s empirical work in Getting the Diagnosis Right is unconvincing in 
the context of extreme underdevelopment because the economies which they apply their 
                                                 
18 It also seems rather odd to refer to static general equilibrium context – which the Theory of Second Best 
relates to – rather a growth context. Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990), for example, argue that government 
induced distortions played an important role in directing the private sector towards sectors of future 
importance to the national economy. In other words, these governments got the price wrong. 
19 Rodrik’s own work is reasonably supportive of this statement. For example, high levels of inequality in 
Latin America adversely affected conflict management as well as policymaking in that region (Alesina & Rodrik, 
1994), and the difficulties experienced by developing countries in the face of the international oil shocks of the 
1970s essentially depended upon their institutions of conflict management (Rodrik, 1999).   21
growth diagnostics to are middle income Latin American economies. Engaging in diagnostic 
exercises for El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Brazil, as Rodrik and colleagues do, is 
all very well, but it at least seems possible that these economies were selected by the authors 
precisely because a single large obstacle to growth can indeed be quite easily identified for 
each of these economies. But I am rather more skeptical that Rodrik and colleagues could 
pick out a typical African country and - out of the numerous challenges facing such a 
country (lack of primary education, poor roads, desperately low life expectancy, HIV/AIDS, 
government corruption, over-regulated labor markets, and poor macroeconomic 
management) - persuasively demonstrate that any one of these problems will easily present 
itself as the largest direct obstacle to growth. The situation in many developing countries is 
rarely so black and white.  
Moreover, the argument that all these socio-economic problems are deeply 
interconnected is intuitively attractive. Such a hypothesis challenges Rodrik’s conclusion that 
removing distortions one-by-one will be more effective than multi-dimensional reform 
strategies. Consider some examples. Can we eliminate HIV without improving education or 
changing cultural attitudes? Bloom and Canning (2003) answer in the negative?  Can we 
implement better public policies as a whole without curtailing government corruption? The 
World Bank position now seems to be “No, we cannot”. Or consider again East Asia ‘big 
socioeconomic push’ in education, health, infrastructure, industry and agriculture: can we 
make up a plausible story to support the idea that development in all these socio-economic 
sectors reinforced developmental processes in other sectors. Of course we can. This kind of 
cumulative causality was one of Myrdal’s (1968) chief conjectures, and The World Bank 
(1993) report on the East Asian Miracle quite explicitly points out the multidimensional 
nature of East Asia’s success. So on these grounds one could reasonably conclude that, due 
to the great interconnectedness of the large number of problems facing a typical 
underdeveloped country (East Asia in 1950s, or Africa today), Rodrik’s proposal of 
identifying and targeting one supposedly binding constraint may be both inherently difficult 
and ultimately futile.  
Another concern in adopting a growth diagnostic approach is its almost nihilistic 
implications for existing knowledge about development. One extreme interpretation of 
Rodrik’s critique is that there is no such thing as ‘best practice’ economics: we need growth 
diagnostics because what is best practice can only ever be context-specific. But that   22
conclusion seems highly inconsistent with much of Rodrik’s own research agenda,
20 and with 
development experience. For whilst Rodrik points to the failures of importing policy 
blueprints from outside – especially from Washington – he tends overlook those examples in 
which policies did appear to travel well.  This is ironic in some sense, for other East Asian 
Revisionists were the first to illustrate the great extent to which South Korea and Taiwan 
purposively copied Japan’s industrialization strategies, and how the rest of South East Asia 
has thereafter learned from South Korean and Taiwanese experience (The-World-Bank, 
1993). Indeed, one could quite plausibly argue that what is still needed today is greater and 
more effective information sharing, and more adaptation of best practice strategies, not less. 
For example, how many non-Asian countries have really tried to adopt and adapt the kind of 
East Asian growth strategy outlined in Wade’s 10-point agenda above (Tables 1 and 2)? Few, 
if any. Indeed, one interpretation of the experience of recent decades is not that non-Asian 
countries have erroneously tried to adopt ‘best practices’, but that they have erroneously 
tried to adopt a neoclassical strategy ill-suited to early stages of development.
21  
In summary, there are some significant dangers in the binding constraint growth 
diagnostic advocated by Rodrik and his collaborators. First, such an approach may leave us 
vulnerable to under-ambition, as Sachs suggests. Second, the approach may not be effective: 
favorable reform outcomes in one area may regularly require reforms in other areas (i.e. 
more strategic sequencing) or simultaneous reform in a number of areas, as per the big 
socio-economic pushes witnessed in East Asia. And third, there is a danger that if Rodrik’s 
analysis is taken to its extreme implications then poor countries may be overly reluctant to 
learn lessons from other countries that are (a) performing well because of identifiably 
effective government interventions; and (b) possessive of sufficiently similar economic 
characteristics to Country A, so that the interventions in question are potentially transferable 
                                                 
20 Let me give some examples. Rodrik’s Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich argues 
that these countries grew rich from a government-led domestic investment boom (rather than export booms) 
supported by high levels of initial equality and human capital. Rodrik’s Taking Trade Policy Seriously: Export 
Subsidization as a Case Study in Policy Effectiveness is a more explicit practice of discerning best practice export 
subsidization policies. As one might expect of Rodrik, neither of these papers is over-ambitious in selling a 
‘best practice’, but both papers serve to illustrate that one of the most important things economists do is share 
information on the policies that work, the policies that don’t, and the conjectured reasons why.  
21 For example, Wade (1990, p. 371-372) heavily stressed the need to create an elite bureaucratic cadre at the 
top of the policymaking pyramid, as per Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. And yet The World Bank 
and most poor countries have devoted almost all their attention to decentralizing political power. Is this the 
futile adoption of best practice policies?   23
after suitable adaptation.
22 There are probably too many uncertainties here to categorically 
reject a binding constraints growth diagnostic altogether.
23 But these considerations 
discussed above need to be more explicitly explored by Rodrik and his Growth Diagnostics co-
authors before their approach can be accepted as a viable alternative to alternative practices 
and proposals. 
 
IV.4 Democracy and development 
Whilst Rodrik argues that there is very little evidence that any particular policy or 
institution will work in any given country – with the implication that making foreign aid 
flows conditional upon standard policy reforms, such as trade liberalization, are 
inappropriate - he seems to make the exception in the case of a ‘meta-institution’, 
democracy. Democratic institutions, he argues, lead to more ‘predictable’, less volatile and 
more equally distributed growth (Rodrik, 2000b). In positive terms, I find this argument the 
least well supported component of his paradigm. For whilst one can always proclaim the 
virtues of democracy on normative grounds, the notion that democracy increases or 
improves growth at early stages of development is a highly contestable claim.  
The first hurdle for democracy advocates is precisely that region which Rodrik and many 
other economists have extracted so many development lessons from, East Asia. Rodrik is 
aware of this, of course - “In policy circles, the discussion on the relationship between 
political regime type and economic performance inevitably gravitates toward the experience 
of a handful of economies in East and Southeast Asia” (Rodrik, 2000b) – but he argues that 
“A systematic look at the evidence, however, yields a much more sanguine conclusion” as to 
the virtues of democracy.  
This approach to interpreting the economic merits of democracy seems to me a 
significant methodological inconsistency. On the one hand Rodrik is happy to attach critical 
importance to the economic experience of “a handful of economies in East and Southeast 
Asia” in any number of his most prominent works (Rodrik, 1994, 1995a, 1997a, 2005a, 
                                                 
22 Moreover, such adaptations are likely to be cost effective in that they presumably save on technical resources. 
23 Another issue I have not paid much explicit attention to is the level at which a binding constraint is 
defined. For example, one might conclude at a fairly aggregated level that human capital is a constraint. 
One might go further and conclude that health was a greater direct constraint than education, but that 
educational investments were important to improving health. So whilst one might conclude that there is a 
binding constraint at a highly aggregated level, removing this constraint may require multiple instruments. 
Nevertheless, I still find it difficult to reconcile the binding constraints approach with the truly broad ‘big 
socioeconomic push’ that East Asian countries embarked on.   24
forthcoming),
24 and equally happy to vilify cross-country econometric work in several other 
papers (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2001; Rodrik, 2005b). But on the other hand Rodrik attaches 
little or no importance to the political experience of East Asia, and is instead content to rely 
on cross-country econometric work of questionable value.
25 Moreover, recent experience 
gives ample evidence of the troubles which premature democratization can create for both 
economic and political stability. Consider, for example, political instability in the Philippines 
post-Marcos, in Indonesia post-Suharto, in Thailand under Thaksin’s brief reign, or Latin 
America’s poor economic performance since a wave of democratization hit that continent in 
the late 1980s (Chile notwithstanding).
26 
This is not to say that democratization is not a worthy long term goal.
27 And even at 
lower levels of development there exist authoritarian regimes which are so fundamentally 
corrupt and ‘kleptrocratic’ that democracy – if it can be effectively instituted - is certainly a 
worthwhile ‘second best’ alternative to a benevolent dictatorship. One can likewise accept 
that decentralization – the other popular political and fiscal reform advocated for LDCs - is 
also an effective second best institution in countries where the central bureaucracy is at once 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, Rodrik’s assessment of South Korean and Taiwanese growth (Rodrik, 1995a) does identify the 
importance of the bureaucracies’ independence from political interests and instability. However, Rodrik – to 
my knowledge at least - never explicitly uses these countries’ experiences to draw the conclusion that their 
authoritarianism was favorable for their development. 
25 For example, in fleshing out his cross-country regressions, Rodrik concludes that “Long-standing 
democracies such as India, Costa Rica, Malta, and Mauritius have experienced significantly less volatility than 
countries like Syria, Chile, or Iran, even after controlling for country size and external shocks.” But the growth 
regressions he uses would, in my view, do a poor job of explaining volatility, or the lack thereof, in these sorts 
of countries. Syria, Chile and Iran, for example, are all quite heavily dependent upon natural resource revenues, 
and Chile and Syria also have quite volatile weather systems which induce volatility in agricultural output 
especially. Syrian agriculture, for example, is highly dependent upon very unreliable rainfall, and is located in a 
relatively small geographical area, so it is therefore no surprise that its agricultural output is extremely volatile.  
It is difficult to argue that this volatility has much to do with institutions since irrigation potential is a 
geographically constrained factor. Moreover, whilst democratic India also has volatile weather systems, this 
largely exogenous source of volatility does not show up in aggregate data because the volatility varies from 
region to region (i.e. it is not highly covariate as some Indian states have predictable monsoons whilst others 
have very unpredictable monsoons). Nevertheless, output within (democratic) Indian states is highly volatile 
and this does show up in the state level data. Whilst Rodrik attempts to control for the fact that larger countries 
such as India will necessarily record lower volatility (through diversity of outputs and regions) by specifying 
population size as a control, this will only be a highly imperfect control (it does not factor in geographic 
diversity within countries, for example). In short, I remain unconvinced that a country like India records less 
institution-based output volatility than a country like Syria.  
26 On this point I find it a curiosity that Rodrik and his sympathizers in The World Bank (The-World-Bank, 
2005) blame Latin America’s weak performance in the 1980s and 1990s on The Washington Consensus 
reforms when these countries were also undergoing significant political change, namely democratization. 
27 If authoritarian regimes in East Asia were pro-growth but not pro-poor one might still reasonably defend 
democracy. But of course, this is not the case. East Asian growth was very pro-poor and included significant 
land reform (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) and a Green Revolution that was more pro-poor than democratic 
India. Hence Suharto’s famous phrase ‘economic democracy’.   25
politically entrenched but economically ineffective.
28 But it is another thing entirely to argue 
for democratization – on a positive economic basis, at least - in poor countries which have at 
least obtained moderate economic momentum. Indeed the lesson extracted by Robert Wade 
(1990) – who is consistent in extracting both economic and political lessons from East Asia - 
is that LDCs must establish effective institutions of political authority before the political 
system is widely democratized.
29  
Ongoing research in economics and political science would do well to reassess this aspect 
of development in order to better understand why economic democracies can sometimes 
emerge under authoritarianism, why political democracies vary so much in their sustainability 
and effectiveness, and why the worldwide decentralization experiment has thus far achieved 
such mixed results (Anwar & Thomson, 2004). But until the economic and political science 
professions can come up with more definitive answers to these sorts of questions, 
unconditional arguments for democratization as a growth-enhancing institutional reform 
remain primarily ideological in nature. 
  
V. Conclusions 
Professor Rodrik and his collaborators present a persuasive critique of the most 
influential development paradigm of the last thirty years or so, the Washington Consensus. 
In its place they encourage policymakers to be more open-minded and experimental with the 
kinds of policies and institutions which successful growth strategies might include, but also 
more systematic and realistic in the design and implementation of those strategies. Rodrik 
also presents a forceful critique of the looking glass through which we view development, 
and shows how extracting the types of lessons policymakers really need requires a more 
nuanced interpretation of the facts that can be presented by either selective case studies or 
highly aggregated growth regressions.  
                                                 
28 Other arguments for more participatory political systems – such as political and economic decentralization – 
which Rodrik presumably supports (as does The World Bank) also receive heavily qualified support from East 
Asian experience. As Wade and Rodrik himself documents, significant political power in South Korea and 
Taiwan belonged to just a handful of elites for most of these countries development histories. On the other 
hand, recent evidence suggests that one of the most politically decentralized countries in the world is 
authoritarian China (Binswanger, 2006). But effective decentralization is by no means easy, as recent research 
amply documents (Anwar & Thomson, 2004). 
29 Adelman and Morris (1967) long ago reached the same conclusion via cross-country evidence, and 
Huntingon (1968) provides an in-depth political treatise on the evolution towards democratic systems.   26
But whilst I am in agreement with the main thrust of Professor Rodrik’s post-Washington 
paradigm – namely its caustic critique of neoclassical policymaking, its incorporation of a 
wider range of market failures (many of which are quite specific to LDCs), and its emphasis 
on the importance of institutions in a general way - I have also argued that there are still 
some serious deficiencies in this paradigm. Whilst it is true that institutional diversity is an 
important feature of successful developing countries, it is not obvious that the differences 
between ‘miracles’ are more important than their similarities. Whilst the hard work is indeed 
done at home, foreign blueprints can also be very useful. Whilst laundry list reform strategies 
may be overly ambitious, the ‘binding constraints’ growth diagnostic approach is arguably 
under-ambitious, and is not yet well supported by growth theory or empirics. And although 
democracy is a worthy long term economic goal with important non-economic virtues, the 
evidence that democracy is necessary for achieving pro-poor economic growth at early stages 
of development is questionable indeed.  
These caveats aside, the ideas of Professor Rodrik and his collaborators have received 
deserved recognition from both the academic community at large and, eventually at least, 
from the international organizations for which his ideas are most relevant, especially The 
World Bank. For whilst Rodrik has abstained from turning the wheel full circle, he has 
nevertheless provided the profession with a long list of original, insightful and provocative 
reinterpretations of development history. Rodrik’s particular brand of revisionism should 
prompt theorists and policymakers alike into seriously rethinking the content and 
formulation of development policies.  And in a period in which the only consensus thus far 
is that the old Consensus was wrong (Stiglitz, 2004), Professor Rodrik’s challenge to 
conventional wisdom may yet prove decisively influential in reshaping development 
strategies in a post-Washington era.   27
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